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Me Medicine v. We Medicine:




A Reality Check for Personalized Healthcare


We are in a new era of the life sciences, but in no area of research is the promise greater than in personalized medicine.— Barack Obama, as a Senator introducing the bill that became the Genomics and Personalized Medicine Act 2007

The soaring promises made by personalized medicine advocates are probably loftier than those in any other medical or scientific realm today. In addition, the range of therapies covered by personalized medicine is even greater than then-Senator Obama realized. Direct-to-consumer genetic testing, personal tailored drug regimes, private umbilical cord blood banking and “enhancement” technologies all come under that rubric. Part of this book’s own promise is to introduce you to personalized medicine’s lesser-known variants, illustrating how they all chime together in their hymns and psalms in praise of what I call “Me Medicine”. 

Sometimes the clarion calls for these new technologies are delivered with almost messianic fervor, as in the case of this paean from Francis Collins, former co-director of the Human Genome Project:

We are on the leading edge of a true revolution in medicine, one that promises to transform the traditional “one size fits all” approach into a much more powerful strategy that considers each individual as unique and as having special characteristics that should guide an approach to staying healthy. Although the scientific details to back up these broad claims are still evolving, the outline of a dramatic paradigm shift is coming into focus…[Y]ou have to be ready to embrace this new world (Collins 2010: xxiv-xv).

Do I? Why? I’d like to see more evidence before I decide. It’s not that I’m afraid of new biotechnologies-- I’ve spent my working life analyzing them and their ethical implications. Nor is it because I don’t necessarily believe the promises will come true, although there are good reasons to doubt that they will ever really amount to a “dramatic paradigm shift”.  

Certainly vast sums are pouring into personalized medicine: plans to spend $416 million on a four-year plan were announced in December 2011 by the National Institutes of Health (Fidanboylu 2011), and private sector interest is also intense. 
But the Human Genome Project (HGP) was also very generously funded, without having so far produced correspondingly weighty results for translational medicine, even a decade after it was announced that the human genome had been fully sequenced (Arribas-Ayllon 2010, Genewatch UK 2010). “Indeed, after 10 years of effort, geneticists are almost back to square one in knowing where to look for the roots of common disease” (Wade 2010). Productivity in drug development actually declined after the HGP announced its completion, as did new license applications to the Food and Drug Administration (Kimmelman 2010). 

And we’ve been here before with other supposed “paradigm shifts” that haven’t yet translated into routine clinical care, including gene therapy and embryonic stem cell research (Coughlan 2011). Likewise for personalized medicine, current genetic tests and molecular diagnostics only apply to about two per cent of the population, according to a March 2012 report from United Health’s Center for Health Reform and Modernization (United Health 2012: 3). A Harris poll of 2760 patients and physicians in January and February 2012 indicated that doctors had only recommended personal genetic tests for four per cent of their patients: hardly the stuff of a paradigm shift, at least not yet (United Health 2012: 4). Some experts call the genomic revolution merely a “myth”, arguing that at the very most we’re witnessing a gradual process of incremental change, consistent with past trends in diagnostic innovation (Hogarth and Martin 2012),
 
Yet despite the lack of substantial evidence that personalized genetic testing is actually having a huge impact, the publicity around it may well be doing so—not necessarily for the best. I’m concerned that “Me Medicine” is eclipsing what I call “We Medicine,” so that we’re losing sight of the notion that biotechnology can and should serve the common good.  In my view, we would be wrong to prioritize personalized health technologies at the expense of public health measures, which have brought us comparative freedom from the ill health that plagued our ancestors. I see a pattern here—not only a similarity among all the apparently disparate forms of personalized medicine, but also a familiar political formula: “private good, public bad”. 

Personalized medicine consciously appeals to the idea of the individual making free choices about her health, but in a much more sophisticated way than the simplistic stereotypes about free markets in health care versus welfare states, played out to tiresome length in the debates over the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 2010. Because it’s much more palatable medicine—excuse the pun—it may not look like it’s even part of that debate at all, but it is. If we take the Me Medicine fork in the healthcare road, we can’t simultaneously go down the We Medicine route--the road less traveled by, in Robert Frost’s phrase.  

For example, there’s been considerable growth in private umbilical cord blood banks, which charge a fee to store cord blood in an individual “account” for the newborn in the hope that stem cell technology will eventually allow the blood to be used as a sort of personal spare parts kit. With one or two exceptions, these banks reserve the blood for the child’s private use—Me Medicine-- but there are also public cord blood banks—We Medicine-- which actually achieve better clinical results (RCOG 2002, 2006). Yet if enough parents bank their baby’s umbilical cord blood privately, there won’t be a sufficient supply for public cord blood banks, although those can be seen as both medically and ethically superior.

At the moment, perhaps surprisingly, the United States leads the world in the number of public cord blood banks. Despite our famous cult of individualism, we’re tops in We Medicine there, but we won’t stay that way if current trends toward private banking continue. Here and elsewhere, what may look like innocent individual consumer choices will shape how we as a society assure our health, and that of future generations. So we need to think long and hard about how we want to prioritize the respective claims of Me and We, rather than just hop aboard the personalized medicine bandwagon like the great majority of commentators. This book is intended to let you make up your own mind about how you see those priorities, by giving you accurate up-to-date medical and scientific evidence and locating the new technologies in their ethical and political context.

First, however: what exactly are these new personalized technologies, and how can they make such grand claims?  Unlike this book, most authors treat the various aspects of personalized medicine as separate developments, with different diagnoses and prognoses. They do at first look disparate. Direct-to-consumer genetic testing, in which a limited selection of genetic analyses are performed on a sample of saliva or a cheek swab, is probably the most familiar of the Me Medicine technologies.  The field, which includes a number of big “players” such as 23andMe, deCODEme and Navigenics, has been widely publicized by journalists who tried “retail genetics” out for themselves (e.g. Fleming 2008).  

Along with the example of private cord blood banking, discussed above, another increasingly familiar example of Me Medicine from clinical care is pharmacogenetics or pharmacogenomics. Here genetic typing is used to determine a patient’s probable response to drugs such as cancer treatments and to tailor the pharmaceutical regime personally. Although, as we’ve seen, the percentage of patients undergoing such genetic diagnostics and treatments is still in the low single figures, chemical or neurocognitive enhancement technologies are even further away from everyday clinical practice, although they’ve provoked column inches about what one of their most prominent opponents calls “the case against perfection” (Sandel 2004).

What do all these apparently disparate technologies have in common? Essentially, they’re linked by two largely unchallenged assumptions: that “individual” is better than “social”, and that we’re on the cusp of a “true revolution in medicine” to make it more individualized. But are these assumptions justified? 

They may or may not be—that’s what we’ll discover as we go along-- but the really interesting question is why so few have challenged them. The bookstores are full of somewhat dewy-eyed and often uncritically “pro” books about personalized medicine, such as Misha Angrist’s Here is a Human Being: At the Dawn of Personal Genomics,  Francis Collins’s The Language of Life: DNA and the Revolution in Personalized Medicine.  Kevin Davies’s The $1000 Genome: The Revolution in DNA Sequencing and the New Era of Personalized Medicine, Thomas Goetz’s The Decision Tree: Taking Control of Your Health in the Era of Personalized Medicine, Eric Topol’s The Creative Destruction of Medicine: How the Digital Revolution Will Create Better Health Care, or Lone Frank’s My Beautiful Genome: Exploring Our Genetic Future, One Quirk at a Time.  But this book doesn’t take a knee-jerk “anti” position: it just aims to be balanced. 

We need to ask why so many multinational firms, researchers, and—yes-- Presidents of the United States have all bought into personalized medicine. We urgently need a disinterested and balanced critique of personalized medicine’s origins, the commercial interests that lie behind it and the dynamics of its marketing as what I term “retail therapy”—medical treatment and diagnostic regimes conceived as consumer goods. Just as the body itself has been commodified—the argument of my previous book Body Shopping—so medicine is increasingly seen as a commodity, in both insurance-based and more socialized healthcare systems. 

Historically,  it was not Me Medicine but We Medicine-- programs like public vaccination, clean water and screening for tuberculosis -- that brought us reduced infant mortality, comparative freedom from contagious disease and an enhanced life span. Yet today many of these public programs seem to be increasingly distrusted, even detested. Some US campaigners  against the measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) vaccine have accused physicians who administer the vaccine of being in the same league as Nazi concentration camp doctors (reported in Mnookin 2011: 14).  Vaccination programs are in profound trouble in many parts of the world. In India, a similar though less virulent reaction has arisen against what might seem like a model public health campaign, the vaccination of young girls against the human papillomavirus implicated in cervical cancer (Sarojini et al. 2011; Sengupta et al. 2011). In Muslim areas of northern Nigeria, which accounts for about 45% of polio cases worldwide, a World Health Organization polio vaccination campaign was boycotted as a Western plot to spread HIV and AIDS through adulterated injections (Jegede 2007).

In contrast, when a development combines scientific mystique and the wand-waving word “personal”, the reaction worldwide will probably be overwhelming adulation. That was very much the case when Korean researcher Hwang Woo Suk announced  in 2005 that he had successfully created eleven “patient-specific” stem cell lines. Hwang was pointing toward the possibility that eventually everyone could have a personal spare parts kit, overcoming the problem of immune rejection when organs are transplanted (Hwang 2004, 2005). “After Hwang’s article was published, he turned into a sacred figure” (Paik 2007). The reaction, East and West, was so euphoric that Hwang offered to set up a worldwide franchise of his method, with satellite laboratories in California and England—before his claim was revealed to be totally fraudulent. He hadn’t created a single successful cell line, although he had published his “findings” in the prestigious journal Science-- fooling both the editors and the scientific world at large. 

But how was that possible? Although it’s a bit speculative, perhaps one reason is the spell cast by the idea of personalized therapy.  Some of that unconfined joy and uncritical adulation had a genuinely scientific appeal—if the technique had worked, and if it hadn’t required dangerous levels of hormonal stimulation to produce the human eggs that the technique demanded in huge quantities (Dickenson 2006, Baylis 2009). But it also seems plausible that Hwang’s patient-specific stem cells appealed because they pushed the right buttons in our psyches: the ones marked “personal” and “individual”. The possibility of a commercial franchise mooted by Hwang before his unmasking indicates that striking those  targets is also important to corporate interests.

It’s hard to explain why else ferreting out the fraud took determined campaigning by a not-very-well-known Korean feminist group, Korean Womenlink, and the subsequent acknowledgement by Hwang’s principal colleague, Gerald Schatten, that the methods used in sourcing the eggs had been ethically dubious, eventually leading to recognition of the scientific inaccuracy of the claim. It’s also difficult to understand why more attention wasn’t paid to improving the rate of tissue rejection through further advances in the already promising field of immunology, as a few scientists did argue at the time (e.g. Brown 2006). That would mean that we could recruit a wider range of tissue donors without having to worry about tissue-matching, to avoid rejection of the transplant, or the alternative of heavy and risky doses of immunosuppressants. We could concentrate on practical  methods of improving the success of altruistic donation from others, rather than on our own speculative personal spare parts kits.





In writing his 2009 book Experimental Man, David Ewing Duncan-- chief correspondent of National Public Radio’s “Biotech Nation” and director of the Center for Life Science Policy at the University of California, Berkeley—had himself tested for 320 chemical toxins and up to 10 million genetic markers. He spent 22 hours having magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), underwent the drawing of 1.7 liters of blood and endured testing for no fewer than 320 toxins. The total cost of all the tests that Duncan underwent was between $150,000-$500,000. That’s the range Duncan himself gives, which seems more than a little vague, but many of the tests were supplied gratis by the genetic testing industry. Whichever end of the dollar scale turns out to be most accurate, he still consumed a great deal of medical resource. 

Although you might think that there’s nothing particularly liberating about being an experimental guinea pig on such a scale, Duncan urges readers of the book and visitors to his website to sign what he calls a “Personalized Health Manifesto”—“an old-fashioned call to arms and action plan for a new age of health care” (quoted in White 2011). We heard the same campground-meeting rhetoric from Francis Collins. Personalized medicine seems to be becoming the equivalent of nineteenth-century American revivalism.

Back in the 1840s, when the students at Mount Holyoke seminary were called on by college president Mary Lyon to stand up and testify to their desire to lead a Christian life, the young Emily Dickinson was one of the few who remained in her seat. “They thought it queer I didn’t rise,” she remarked afterwards. “I thought a lie would be queerer.” Similarly, Duncan reportedly called on attenders at the US National Undergraduate Bioethics Conference 2011 to demonstrate their conversion to personalized medicine with a show of hands. Only one modern-day Dickinson’s hand remained down. “Too bad,” Duncan reportedly said. “It’s happening anyway” (quoted in White 2011).

To be fair, Duncan actually concludes in his book that the direct-to-consumer genetic tests he tried are mostly disappointing. He advises not placing too much reliance on the results—yet. But when the science is perfected, his reasoning seems to run, what’s not to like?

To start with, that “when” has every appearance of being an “if”, although many proponents of personalized medicine make very big claims indeed. It’s been asserted that a baby could have her genome fully sequenced at birth, along with her susceptibility to particular diseases. She could then enjoy the benefits of made-to-order diagnostic tools and drugs throughout her lifetime (Ginsburg and Willard 2009). That really is the  “Holy Grail” of personalized medicine, but it makes huge and currently unfounded assumptions about how much genetic and genomic medicine is actually able to predict. Most major diseases are caused by the interplay of many genes rather than one, and they arise from both environmental and genetic causes (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2010).

Proponents of personalized medicine’s benefits point with some justification, however, to the evolving area of biomedicine known as pharmacogenetics or pharmacogenomics. For example, the drug warfarin is an oral anticoagulant commonly used to prevent or manage venous thrombosis. It’s sometimes difficult to determine the correct dosage for an individual patient: thinning the blood excessively can be an unwanted side effect, carrying its own risks. But now warfarin dosage can be tailored to identify particular patients at increased risk of bleeding, by sequencing two genes that account for most of the variation in how people react to the drug. Even here, there’s some skepticism about whether pharmacogenetics has actually improved outcomes for patients (Genewatch UK 2010) and whether more extensive reliance on personally tailored drug regimes requires a “leap of faith” (Gilbert 2010), as I’ll discuss at greater length in Chapter Three. None the less, if sufficient evidence were amassed to show that pharmacogenetic dosage of warfarin is clinically effective,  that would exemplify one meaning of personalized medicine that does seem genuinely beneficial: drug treatment tailored to the patient on an evidence-based model, for better clinical care. 

Whether that’s really personalized in the sense of individualized, however, is arguable. In the warfarin example, individuals are classified into groups according to which allele (variant) of the relevant gene they have. It might be better called “small group medicine”, though that’s nowhere near as catchy.  Personalized medicine in the warfarin example is still more “We” than “Me”, even though warfarin is frequently cited by Me Medicine advocates as proof that truly individualized medicine is already a reality.

Even the biotechnology industry-linked Personalized Medicine Coalition (2009) concedes that pharmacogenetics is about population subgroup response to particular drugs. It’s still an improvement because, they argue, only 50% of the population responds to a typical drug-- a figure which can be translated into a higher probability through pharmacogenetics. Of course this is an improvement, but it’s still not really personalized medicine: a probability applies by definition to a statistical group. The phenomenon of statistical independence means that any probability can’t tell you with certainty that you as an individual will or will not respond to a drug, any more than the 50% probability that a coin toss will come up heads can predict whether the next toss will come up tails.

Evangelists for personalized medicine often adduce the discovery of blood types as the pioneering example of individualized care. Yet that, too, is about assigning individual patients to serum groups (A, O, B and AB), further divided into subgroups by rhesus type (positive or negative). The discovery of blood groups did of course revolutionize transplant surgery, and so it could count as a genuine example of a paradigm shift—but whether it’s truly “personalized” is also arguable. 

Advocates of personalized medicine frequently play on the stereotype that traditional medicine ignores our individuality. For Eric Topol, hidebound conventional therapies require “creative destruction” in favour of a genuinely individualized medicine:

This is a new era of medicine, in which each person can be near [sic] fully defined at the individual level, instead of how we practice medicine at a population level, with mass screening policies for such conditions as breast or prostate cancer and use of the same medication and dosage for a diagnosis rather than a patient. We are each unique human beings, but up until now  there was no way to establish one’s biologic or physiologic individuality (Topol 2012: viii).

Likewise, the Personalized Medicine Coalition asserts that: “Physicians can now go beyond the ‘one size fits all’ model of medicine to make the most effective clinical decisions for individual patients” (Personalized Medicine Coalition: 3). Francis Collins used similar language when he predicted that personalized medicine will “transform the traditional ‘one size fits all’ approach into a much more powerful strategy that considers each individual as unique” (Collins 2010: xxiv-xv).

Yet good practitioners have always relied on close observation of the particular patient. As Hippocrates said, “It is far more important to know what person the disease has than to know what disease the person has”. The notion of “whole person treatment” didn’t originate with pharmacogenetics or direct-to-consumer genetic testing. Indeed, as Collins himself admits (quoted in Duncan 2009: 34), taking a family history, that staple of old-fashioned medical practice, still reveals risk proclivity for particular diseases more accurately than consumer genetics. And looking at the family, by definition, means moving beyond the individual, from Me to We.

So it seems fair to say that personalized medicine is nowhere near as new or innovative as it claims to be, nor as successful. Direct-to-consumer genetic testing, for example, is likely to throw up conflicting results, because the methods are not standardized and the disease probabilities are not universally accepted by experts. These “retail genetics” firms test for forms of genetic information (“single nucleotide polymorphisms” or “SNPs”, single-letter differences in DNA between individuals), but none of them test for the same set of SNPs. Much to his consternation, David Ewing Duncan received three frantically different assessments of his heart attack risk from three different genetic testing companies. The director of deCODEme, Kari Stephansson, even telephoned him personally from Iceland to urge him to start taking cholesterol-lowering statins right away—but the other tests had rated him at medium or low risk of developing dangerously high cholesterol. As Duncan puts it in a laconic chapter subheading, “I’m doomed. Or not.”

Yet Duncan remains an ardent advocate of personalized medicine. Even more critical observers tend not to go beyond the biomedical reasons for doubting whether personalized medicine really has a future (Hebert et al. 2008; Nuffield Council 2010). I’m not dismissing those medical and scientific doubts: they are valid and valuable. In the case of medical professional bodies’ recommendations, like the evidence-based judgement on DTC genetic testing of the American Society for Clinical Oncology (Robson et al. 2010), they’re entirely appropriate to the task and competence of the observers. But for this book’s purposes—a comprehensive and skeptical survey of all the various trends toward Me Medicine—we need to go further. 

Let’s break out of the biomedical box and introduce four wider social, political and ethical reasons why people might be tempted to buy into personalized medicine: 1) threat and contamination, 2) narcissism and “Bowling Alone”, 3) corporate interests and neo-liberalism, and finally  4) choice and autonomy. After a preliminary appraisal here, these four possible hypotheses will be evaluated against each of the specific medical developments examined in successive chapters. By the end of the book,  we should have a much clearer idea of the profound social and political reasons why Me Medicine threatens to  edge out We Medicine, and a rational program for doing something about it, if that’s what we decide is appropriate.

BOX
Four approaches to understanding the Me Medicine v. We Medicine Phenomenon

1.	Threat and contamination
2.	Narcissism and “Bowling Alone”
3.	Corporate interests and political neo-liberalism




1. Threat and contamination

In his book, subtitled “what one man’s body reveals about his future, your health and our toxic world”, David Ewing Duncan reveals that his testing program—testing in all senses-- was motivated not just by intellectual curiosity, but by a sense of threat and contamination. Unbeknownst to his early environmental activist mother, Duncan spent his idyllic Kansas boyhood wading in streams full of chemical runoff or mining the ”motherlode” of a landfill site for old bottles, broken machines, steering wheels, and, as it turned out, heavy metals. Brought up to believe that he came from a family of long-lived individuals, he describes feeling fragile for the first time when he discovers that his genes can’t protect him against the abnormally high levels of toxic residues in his blood. In a circular and ironic relationship with threat, the Experimental Man project that he underwent to take control of his health has actually left him feeling more at risk than ever before.

That’s one sense of threat, but there are also others that might help to explain the rise of personalized medicine. Contamination and pollution as powerful motivating fears can of course extend to many forms of “dirt” and impurity (Douglas 1966). The UK system of altruistic blood donation is increasingly being bypassed by people wanting to bank their own blood for future use. Frightened by possible contamination of communal blood banks by HIV and BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or “mad cow” disease), patients scheduled for operations may now choose to avoid that threat by banking their own blood in advance (Waldby and Mitchell 2006: 54). Once the epitome of We Medicine, the marvel of efficiency and altruism that Richard Titmuss depicted in his influential book The Gift Relationship, the UK national blood service too risks being transformed into a form of Me Medicine. The model for blood use would then become one of depositing in a personal account, rather than donating to or drawing on a communal resource. 

Personal or “autologous” blood depositing is still only practiced in a minority of cases: the patient must be healthy enough to withstand not only the procedure, but also the withdrawal of blood beforehand. But more people would do it if they could. A Eurobarometer survey of European public opinion found that 25 per cent of respondents would only accept their own blood if they needed a transfusion. Another 23 per cent would also be willing to take blood from a known person such as a friend or relative, though not from a stranger (Waldby and Mitchell 2006: 55). That brings the total who want nothing to do with communal blood up to roughly half the European survey population: powerful evidence of a growing sense of threat and contamination in what was once seen as the quintessential symbol of social solidarity, blood donation (Hermitte 2006). 

In the UK, the Factor VIII hemophiliac controversy and the emergence of untreatable variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD, a form of dementia linked to “mad cow disease”) do at least give patients some reason to fear a threat from communal blood. But we’ll will see in Chapter Four that  private umbilical cord blood banking for an infant’s personal future use is also on the rise, although the actual evidence indicates that rather than reducing the threat of danger,  it may actually pose a risk to the baby (Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, 2001 and 2006). Yet perceived threat is highly relevant, in the lengthy but sometimes inaccurate lists of diseases from which private banks claim the baby can be protected by banking the blood. 

The linkage between toxin threat and personal genetics was consciously built into the Human Genome Project itself, British geneticist Helen Wallace maintains (2009). Using documents obtained through litigation, she’s produced extensive evidence, which I’ll examine critically in the next chapter, purportedly demonstrating that Big Tobacco threw itself into funding genetic and genomic research in the hope of narrowing down those who were ‘genetically susceptible’ to tobacco smoke, thus reassuring the majority of the population that they were at no risk from smoking. 
Wallace claims that the tobacco industry even promoted the idea that an unknown gene both drove particular people to smoke and made them genetically vulnerable to carcinogens in cigarettes. No such genetic basis for wanting to smoke or for being particularly susceptible to smoking ever materialized, of course. But the notion of splitting off certain vulnerable individuals, the framing of smoking as a consumer choice and the background sense of threat all fit uncomfortably neatly into the pattern of Me Medicine.

These examples all draw on physiological threats, but it might well be said that the current state of healthcare leaves us all feeling threatened for financial or political reasons, such as spiralling costs, the difficulty in finding insurance and the reluctance of many family doctors to take on new Medicare patients.  Even in the UK and elsewhere in Europe, austerity cuts mean that unified and universal healthcare is increasingly under threat. Although the UK still formally retains the National Health Service, in March 2012 a government-sponsored bill, condemned by medical professional bodies, introduced radical new provisions that have been criticized as likely to lead to “cherry-picking” of better-off patients and neglect of the less wealthy (Sparrow 2011). In April 2013 responsibility for public health—We Medicine—is to be transferred from the unified National Health Service to cash-strapped  local authorities, who may not all be able to provide the same level of service (Campbell 2012). So here, too, threat is a dominant motif, possibly leading British patients to feel that in future they’ll have to take charge of their own health to a greater degree, topping up their NHS coverage with personal insurance plans and establishing their individual genetic risks for certain diseases.

Yet it also seems possible that personalized medicine could itself produce new kinds of threats, so that patients would simply be exchanging rather than eliminating forms of risks. For example,  if patients are ranked pharmacogenetically according to how well they’re likely to respond to expensive drugs, those less likely to respond may well be denied treatments that they would have received on a “one size fits all” model of prescribing (Fleck 2010). This is the down side of what is more commonly presented as a major advantage of pharmacogenetics: that tailored drugs will “spare expense and side effects” for those who are genetically less likely to benefit from a particular treatment (President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology 2008: s2). 

Given that its most ardent defenders present containment of rising medical costs as a major attraction of personalized medicine, we can assume that this is indeed high on the agenda. Just as those who believe in reincarnation typically think that they were emperors rather than galley slaves in a previous life, so might we all think we will be among the genetic elite who will get the enhanced new products of pharmacogenetics. But what if we’re among the new untouchables instead?

In all these circumstances, it’s natural to feel that you’re going to be on your own if you fall ill, and that it makes sense to try to forecast and minimize your risk by finding out all you can about your genetic propensity to particular diseases. Do-it-yourself genetic testing, for example, is one means to that end. Sometimes firms play up the risk-minimization angle quite directly: for example, a DTC firm offering to rate young adults’ sports abilities by genetic proclivity has been accused of playing on scare stories about deaths in young athletes (Shanks 2011). More frequently, however, DTC firms present themselves not negatively but positively, as “empowering” their customers (Nordgren 2010) —in a hijacking of Sixties rhetoric. For example, 23andMe’s website asserts that “The company was founded to empower individuals and develop new ways of accelerating scientific research.”
 
The virtuous twin of threat might appear to be promise, on which “Me” technologies such as neurological or genetic enhancement clearly play. But it’s worth noting that the promises made by enhancement are for individuals or a comparatively small elite: they will never be mass technologies. Indeed, that designer cachet might be part of the sales pitch. That brings us on to a second possible explanation for the rise and rise of Me Medicine: narcissism.

2. Narcissism and “Bowling Alone”

Is it only a coincidence that the words “me” and “my” are part of the brand for so many DTC genetic testing companies? – such as  23andMe, Knome, deCODEme and MyGenome (Nordgren 2010). Or is retail genetics part of a more generalized trend toward narcissism and self-absorption? 

No single event initiated the narcissism epidemic; instead, Americans' core cultural ideas slowly became more focused on self-admiration and self-expression. At the same time, Americans' faith in the power of collective action in the government was lost (Twenge and Campbell 2009: Kindle location 1206).

Jean Twenge and Keith Campbell, authors of The Narcissism Epidemic, remark on the use of “I”, “me” and “my” as branding devices outside biomedicine—notably the rise and rise of “I” in the iPod, iPhone and iPad. (Even if the “i” is lower-case, it’s still all about “Me.”) David Ewing Duncan actually suggests that eventually we will each own a handheld device, which he jokingly but appropriately terms an “iHealth”. On it, he predicts, we’ll track our genomes and most recent scans, while inputting environmental data as we go through the low-tech drudgery of everyday life (Duncan 2009: 6).

The concept of a narcissism epidemic isn’t strongly medical or scientific, although Twenge and Campbell do produce evidence of a recent rise in narcissistic personality traits on psychological profile tests taken by college students. Mainly, however, they delineate a sense of entitlement that has permeated popular culture and has changed child-rearing practices to over-emphasize the child’s intrinsic specialness, at the expense of awareness of others’ needs. Twenge and Campbell reserve particular scorn for notions about needing to love yourself first before you can love anybody else. As an NBC public service announcement puts it, “You may not realize it, but everyone is born with their one true love-- themselves” (Twenge and Campbell 2009: 240). Narcissism in this sense is different from individualism, and more pernicious. 

America has always been an individualistic nation, but it was focused on ideas of individual liberty, freedom from tyranny, and fundamental equality--values that emphasized independence, not narcissism. But when these powerful ideas were supplemented by the new values of self-admiration and self-expression, the results were ugly (Twenge and Campbell 2009: 1206).

Although Twenge and Campbell don’t make the connection to DTC genetic testing, they do argue that the Internet—on which retail genetics depends-- promotes narcissistic behaviors, such as endlessly refining your Myspace page or fattening up your list of Facebook “friends” to emphasize quantity rather than quality of interactions.  You could also see personalized medicine, particularly retail genetics, as a response to celebrity culture. Acres of genetic analysis all about your individual genome, the extra option of an ancestor-tracing service offered by some DTC firms, the chance to join a Facebook-style social network of other customers offered by some services —all these features could well make purchasers feel that they’re as newsworthy as celebrities, and that their body’s idiosyncrasies are the stuff of drama. Narcissism might go hand in hand with the “genetic mystique” described by Dorothy Nelkin and Susan Lindee in The DNA Mystique: The Gene as Cultural Icon:

Just as the Christian soul has provided an archetypal concept through which to understand the person and the continuity of the self, so DNA appears in popular culture as a soul-like entity, a holy and immortal relic…It is the essential entity—the location of the true self—in the narratives of biological determinism (Nelkin and Lindee 1995: 41-42).

The genetic mystique is intertwined with the idea of “genetic exceptionalism”, the implicit assumption that genetics and genomics reveal more profound truths than other sciences. Normally these two concepts accompany genetic determinism—the proposition that genes determine our behavior, as found in media articles claiming that scientists have discovered genes determining everything from voting patterns (Fowler and Dawes 2007) to becoming a ruthless dictator (Knafo et al. 2008). 

In the case of retail genetics, however, the marketing is predicated not on genetic determinism, but rather on its opposite: an underlying assumption that we are in control of our behavior, so that we can alter unhealthy eating or exercise patterns, for example, to counter a genetic predisposition to heart disease. (We’ll see in Chapter Two that these promises, however, are more honored in the breach than in the observance.) When combined with the “ideology of wellness” (Lippman 1998), geneticization means that those who are well can then take credit for it, not just for their superior genes but also for their initiative in counteracting any “inferior” ones. 

It’s odd to see genetic exceptionalism divorced from genetic determinism: the more usual assumption is that genes dictate not only who we are, but also what we do. Yet actually genetic exceptionalism is strengthened by avoiding the incoherence of genetic determinism. After all, do your genes dictate that you believe that your genes dictate what you believe? That would be an impossibly circular argument.

The notion that retail therapy plays on narcissism and the genetic mystique seems initially plausible, whether or not that sense of narcissism is growing as exponentially as Twenge and Campbell assert. It also accords with the analysis in Robert Putnam’s influential book Bowling Alone (Putnam 2000). Putnam argues that in the last third of the twentieth century, political, civic and religious participation all declined, along with volunteering, trust and reciprocity. A sense of “we”-ness went missing in just thirty years, he says-- replaced instead by the virulent culture wars that still dominate American politics.

The dominant theme is simple: For the first two-thirds of the twentieth century a powerful tide bore Americans into ever-deeper engagement in the life of their communities, but a few decades ago—silently, without warning—that tide reversed and we were overtaken by a treacherous rip current, Without at first noticing, we have been pulled apart from one another and from our communities over the last third of a century (Putnam 2000: 27).

Putnam particularly contrasts the “civic-minded” World War II generation (2000: 17) with their supposedly more self-centered children, the generation that came of age in the 1960s and 1970s. This seems to me an overworked and inaccurate comparison. The so-called “Greatest Generation” may well have been heroic in wartime, but in many cases the trauma of their experiences left them cold and inward-turned. Michael Cunningham’s novel The Hours captures the claustrophobia of the 1950s well, with its fraught description of a postwar housewife’s suicide attempt as an escape from her stifling and conformist family life. Toni Morrison, whose novel Home (2012) likewise de-sentimentalizes the period, has described her urge to “take the scab off the 50s, the general idea of it as very comfortable, happy, nostalgic…Oh, please” (quoted in Brockes 2012: 31).

Putnam admits that the fifties weren’t such a golden age for African or Hispanic Americans, but he insists that at least for whites, “engagement in community affairs and the sense of shared identity and reciprocity had never been higher” (Putnam 2000: 18-19). But even if he’s right about the quantity of civic engagement, that doesn’t say anything about its quality: the uses served by that togetherness. Core civic organizations of the 50s included the likes of the Masons or the Daughters of the American Revolution: one resolutely excluding women, the other recruiting women to protest against any form of progressive policy. At the extreme, Putnam acknowledges that Ku Klux Klansman also engage in community affairs and share a sense of identity. As Grand Wizard Jeff Coleman said, “Really, we’re just like the Lions or the Elks. We want to be involved in the community” (quoted in Putnam 2000: 22). 

By contrast, the stereotype of the 60s generation as hedonistic hippies leaves out the Vietnam draft resistance, Women’s Liberation and the civil rights movement. Many, such as Medgar Evers, the three “Freedom Riders”  killed in Mississippi in 1964, and of course Martin Luther King, died or went to prison for those collective causes. It demeans their memory to see the entire 60s generation as self-centred individualists. And if that’s true, then the notion of remorseless decay from a golden age of immediate postwar togetherness becomes less plausible.

The Narcissism Epidemic and Bowling Alone are both premised on the claim that “social capital”—a set of connections among individuals and norms of reciprocity-- is in grave decline. Yet as we’ve seen, Putnam does recognize that social capital is good for the “in” group but may redound against outsiders. On the logical principle of the excluded middle—the proposition that one factor cannot explain both an effect and the absence of an effect—the social capital explanation runs into difficulties. Does it create a greater willingness to help the socially excluded, or can it actually result in group closure against the dispossessed?

This paradox has important implications for Me Medicine. On the one hand, the supposed decline in social capital could explain the current focus on “Me”-ness: the feeling that you’re responsible for your own health. That would be the implication suggested by The Narcissism Epidemic and Bowling Alone. It might also be an explanation for the rocket-fuelled growth of cosmetic surgery.. In the words of Martha Hennessey of the Catholic Worker movement, “Americans have retreated into collective narcissism” (quoted in Hedges 2010: 156). The only thing we do collectively, in this view, is to agree that we’re allowed to focus entirely on ourselves.

However, more “Me”-ness in medicine and social policy generally could also be explained by an increase in social capital, developed through group closure. It all depends on what the group stands for, not on the mere fact of its being a group, and on how it attains its unity and purpose. Since writing Bowling Alone, which gave the impression that social solidarity was a terminal case, Putnam has praised the teams who canvassed for President Obama in the 2008 Democratic primaries as harbingers of a revived sense of bowling together. That’s all well and good, but their nemesis the Tea Party is also a grass-roots grouping, albeit one with significant support in high financial places (Frank 2012). The sense of shared identity among Tea Party members likewise depends on a common platform, which they would see as self-reliance and independence. It also depends on rallying the troops against the opposition, defined variously as immigrants, Washington bureaucrats, bankers or political leftists—in a collective fashion, although in the paradoxical name of individualism. 
 
It’s been suggested that Americans are most likely to vote in favor of redistributive social and health programs if they see “people like us” as the beneficiaries (Porter 2007). This nasty side effect of group identification isn’t softened by community integration: rather the reverse. “The greater the racial and ethnic diversity of the community, and the more likely it is that voters see their tax dollars going to assist ‘the other’, the lower the support for any spending, be it on health, schools or welfare” (Brody 2009: 139). When a Federal healthcare program with overtones of We Medicine is proposed by a President who embodies “the other” to some white Americans, you might speculate, a wholesale flight into Me Medicine is only to be expected. 

While psychological factors like group identity or narcissism are intuitively plausible  explanations of the rise of Me Medicine, they only take us so far. In fact, they actually produce contradictory predictions about whether We or Me Medicine is likely to result from a decline in communal identity. Let’s consider another possible hypothesis: corporate interests and political neo-liberalism.

3. Corporate interests and political neo-liberalism 

Should scientists see themselves as part of a worldwide NGO [non-governmental organization], upholding a set of shared values? I think that's exactly the way they used to be in previous centuries... and actually that international fellowship is by no means gone, but it's threatened when people try to walk both sides of the line, mingling scientific contribution with profit-making activity... We in Western society are going through a period of intensifying belief in private ownership, to the detriment of the public good. Individual selfishness is held up as the best way to advance civilization, and through the process of globalization these beliefs are being exported to the world as a whole, making it not only less just but also less safe (Sulston and Ferry 2003: 309-310).

In this quotation, Nobel prize-winning geneticist John Sulston sounds at first as if he’s saying that scientists are becoming solitary bowlers or selfish narcissists. Actually, however, he’s criticizing the way in which the “business model” of science is changing from public to private benefit:  what he calls “an intensifying belief in private ownership, to the detriment of the public good”. Sulston doesn’t just present this transformation in atomized individual terms; nor does he see it as primarily psychological, in the way of the narcissism model. Instead he’s suggesting is that “through the process of globalization”, a political and economic transformation, science is moving from We to Me. 





The package of economic and political measures known as neo-liberalism typically includes the following policies:

	“Rolling back the state” through abolishing regulatory legislation and making stringent cuts in public spending, while simultaneously:
	Increasing the involvement of private corporations in key governmental functions, effectively privatizing areas of public provision such as education, health and scientific research, thus:
	Transferring public wealth to private corporations through awarding monopoly contracts and outsourcing necessary services. The underpinning rationale is:
	Viewing markets as the only necessary form of discipline in any economy, in the belief that markets automatically correct their own mistakes, while simultaneously using public sector funds to subsidize loss-making private activities. All these policies are premised on:




Neo-liberalism, also known variously as “free market economics”, “globalization” (the term used by Sulston) or the “Chicago school” after the university associated with its leading exponent Milton Friedman, gained political ascendancy in the United States and United Kingdom during the early 1980s. It’s distinguished from nineteenth-century liberalism by its politically conservative tendencies: John Stuart Mill’s liberalism was in some ways quite radical, for example in his proposals that women should gain the vote and enter Parliament. Modern neo-liberalism, however, is associated with the “neo-conservative” movement (Klein 2007: 15)—although, confusingly, in American politics a “liberal” is someone of the moderate political left. 

The hallmark of neo-liberalism is the belief that state intervention, and in particular the welfare state, is harmful to free markets, which are the true creator of wealth (Hall 2011). The influential political theorist Michael Sandel believes that “market triumphalism” is now so entrenched that rather than having a market economy, we quite simply are a market economy: markets control and define our society, with non-market moral values increasingly edged out (Sandel 2012). Those values might well include those Putnam praises: civic feeling, compassion, solidarity, altruism and a sense that there is such a thing as the common good.

This dominance of the market is the source of the ideology of “private good, public bad”, which I linked earlier in this chapter to the rise of Me Medicine and the decline of We Medicine. If the notion of common welfare is to be distrusted, and if interventions such as public health programs are regarded as interference with individual rights, We Medicine will automatically be suspect. Hostile reactions to vaccination programs, for example, aren’t just a matter of a few vituperative cranks: they’re sanctioned in an indirect way by a more general climate of distrust for any state initiative. 

But although  the official message of neo-liberalism is “hands off”, the actual policies pursued everywhere from banking to biotechnology involve state intervention to subsidize loss-making activity for the private sector. For banks, that’s meant the losses made on junk bonds and sub-prime mortgages; for science, it’s the non-profit-making research and development phases. In both cases we often witness the conversion of the asset to private hands once it’s profitable: what sociologist Stuart Hall calls “siphoning state funding to the private sector” (Hall 2011: 12).  In the UK banking sector, for example, the government rescued the failed bank Northern Rock with taxpayers’ money, to avoid another collapse like Lehman Brothers in the US. But it then overrode calls to keep the bank in national hands and sold it in November 2011 to Virgin Money, reportedly for something like half what it had paid for it. 

In the United States, the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 encouraged private capital to enter the scientific marketplace while promising to subsidize any losses incurred in the process. “To allow wealth from discoveries to be realized, the Act turned the principle of capitalism on its head: ‘private risk yields private loss or gain’ became ‘public risk yields public loss or private gain’—a form of ‘heads I win, tails you lose’” (Krimsky 2011). In April 2012, the Obama White House announced its “National Bioeconomy Blueprint” (Office of Science and Technology Policy 2012), which “outlines steps that agencies can take to drive the bioeconomy” in a time of economic uncertainty, much in the spirit of Bayh-Dole. Mention of any risks from genetic engineering or other technologies is confined to a footnote, otherwise being framed as “beyond the scope of this document” (White House 2012: 6).

We can trace this same neo-liberal trajectory in the development of firms such as deCODE Genetics, which depended on the free public resource of the Icelandic national population database but retained the profits in its own hands (Sigurdsson 2001). It’s also evident in the way that private umbilical cord blood banks in the UK often piggyback on NHS hospital staff provision and rely for their marketing appeal on the hope that stem cell research—typically funded by government research councils and thus by the taxpayer—will “add value” to the stored blood. 

So it’s not just a coincidence that personalized medicine has flourished at the same time that the majority of governments throughout both the developed and developing world—including India and China-- are pursuing neo-liberal policies. In many cases, the profitability of Me Medicine depends directly on those policies. At the highest governmental levels, public backing and money have been solicited to underpin private sector profit-making from biotechnology. 

In Executive Order 13326 of September 2001,  then-President George W. Bush established the Presidential Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST). This was a private-sector body with Cabinet-level status—as if it were an arm of elected government. Its mandate was to “assist the National Science and Technology Council [the public body] in securing private sector involvement in its activities.” Under President Obama, a new Executive Order, number 13539, re-established PCAST on a less obviously pro-industry footing but retained private sector involvement. Its mission is now to “solicit information and ideas from the broad range of stakeholders, including but not limited to the research community, the private sector, universities, national laboratories, State and local governments, foundations, and nonprofit organizations” (section 2ii, Executive Order of April 21, 2010).

Where does the biotechnology industry see profits in personalized medicine? It’s crucial to bear in mind the adage about capitalism not serving existing markets so much as creating demand where none existed before. Even the solidly middle-of-the-road Nuffield Council on Bioethics in the UK remarks of personalized medicine that: “Personalisation is sometimes represented as a response to demand, but in some cases at least it seems to be a case of supply looking for demand” (2010, section 2.29).  Private cord blood banking and retail genetics are both perfect examples of creating demand where none existed before. Who would have predicted twenty years ago that you could get people to pay to bank their infant’s umbilical cord blood or to have a spit sample analyzed to predict their personal propensity to common diseases? 

Even pharmacogenetics, which goes back further than either of those technologies and has a stronger evidence base, also demonstrates political and economic elements. The PCAST report of 2008 states quite openly that industry’s interest in pharmacogenetics isn’t just dictated by scientific developments, but also by cost and market considerations. Because trial and control groups can be genetically matched more closely, pharmacogenetics potentially reduces the size, cost and duration of expensive clinical trials. With over seventy percent of drug trials now performed in the private sector (Steinbrook 2005), the drug industry sees cutting trial costs as crucial to profitability (even though prominent critics such as former New England Journal of Medicine editor Marcia Angell think that the industry actually spends far more on lobbying than on product development: Angell 2005). The PCAST report also holds out the hope for industry that failed trials might still work on sub-sectors of the clinical population,  so that research investment made in dud drugs wouldn’t go to waste. 

Even more importantly for a pharmaceutical industry facing the expiry of patent protection on many of its best-selling drugs, new markets have to be found. By breaking an existing medication down into different “size ranges”, and by persuading customers that they can’t simply rely on a “one-size-fits-all product”, pharmaceutical companies can create new niche markets. Similarly, private umbilical cord blood banking taps into a huge potential market—all expectant mothers who can afford it, plus grandparents—with a “product” which no one could have dreamt of before, but which diligent parents and grandparents may now wrongly believe is essential to the child’s future health.

It would be even more advantageous for the pharmaceutical industry if the  individual patient could be persuaded to pay for genetic typing out of her own pocket, so that she would then know which of the niche pharmaceuticals is her “size”. Although they’re too imprecise at the moment to allow for that, and while they only test for a fraction of relevant SNPs, retail genetic tests accustom healthcare consumers to the idea of personalized drug regimes. In some cases the link isn’t just psychological: it’s much more direct. For example, Navigenics now offers an additional pharmacogenetics service for those who’ve already purchased its tests.

Will a new medication be effective for you? Will a treatment cause serious side effects? Now, genetic insights from Navigenics can help you and your doctor select medications that may be right for your genetic makeup (Navigenics homepage, accessed December 7, 2011).

Now that the $1000 whole-genome test has become a reality, customers could conceivably have all their personalized genetic information ready for access when needed, so that prescribing on a pharmacogenetic model could become much more commonplace.  And if customers pick up the tab for genetic testing, none of this will have cost the  drug companies a bean.  So the costs of diagnostics are beginning to be transferred from the public health system or insurers to the private individual, while profits are transferred from the private individual to private companies. This process is quite consistent with the flow of income predicted by the neo-liberalism model.

Another potential source of profit from personalized genetic testing lies in biobanks—tissue and data repositories that can be sold on to other firms or mined for research.  Why are major retail genetic companies willing to sell direct-to-consumer tests at an all-stock-must-go price? In the next chapter I’ll critically examine the possibility that the test could be a loss leader for a potentially lucrative biobank—particularly because of clauses specifying that the genetic analysis remains the property of the firms. A central National Institute of Health biobank was one of the demands made on government by the private interests in PCAST. But without a nationalized health service to recruit donors free of charge, which has benefited the 500,000-genomes-strong UK Biobank, there’s no alternative for US corporations but to recruit privately, as cheaply as possible.  Some observers think that the acquisition of health and genetic data is the underlying business strategy of the retail genetics industry (e.g. Darnovsky 2008). 

Those customers who buy these tests probably labor under the illusion that they continue to own their personal data and their tissue samples. That argument was put forward in a recent “blog” debate by neo-liberal proponents of retail genetics who oppose FDA regulation of the tests: that it’s not up to government to tell people what they can do with their own bodies and information about their bodies (Hastings Center Report 2011).  But that argument is mistaken: as I’ll elaborate in Chapter Two, once tissue has left the body, the common law traditionally treats it as res nullius or no one’s thing. Originally that tissue was presumed to have no value because it was diseased, but modern biotechnology has radically altered the financial position, although the legal position is largely unchanged (Dickenson 2008). That’s left a vacuum for corporations, researchers and universities to successfully claim legal ownership of the tissue once it’s in their hands (e.g. Moore 1990, Greenberg 2003).

Precisely because so few consumers realize that they’re actually surrendering ownership of their tissue to the firm once they’ve sent off the sample, and because the corporate interests in retail genetics are often very powerful ones, consumers are vulnerable. Me Medicine is typically portrayed as empowering, but the real power and legal rights rest with the corporate interests in this case, particularly when they’re backed up by neo-liberal government policy. Those same policies increasingly spell trouble for We Medicine policies in public health and funding for medicine outside the private sector, as the grim prospect of austerity measures in the public sector stretches out into the foreseeable future. 

In addition, Me Medicine could well increase the demands by patients on healthcare systems,  for example if  they’ve bought retail genetic tests that reveal false positives seemingly requiring treatment, when they’re actually perfectly healthy. (If you think back to David Ewing Duncan’s urgent phone call from Kari Stephansson of deCODE Genetics, insisting that Duncan should go onto statins immediately because of results that were later contradicted by other DTC services, you get the picture.)  Such extra demands on healthcare services are a sort of externality: the costs are passed on to public or private insurance systems. Whether it’s a public or a private provider who picks up the tab, in neither case are they borne by the direct-to-consumer test provider. 

Risk-sharing is the principle behind both insurance-based US health care and UK semi-socialized medicine — even if the groups across which the risk is shared may differ. Where risk stops being shared because low-risk individuals identify themselves as such through personal genetic tests, and high-risk patients are either booted out of the scheme altogether or limited to a very minimal package of health options, that principle is threatened. So the conflict between neo-liberal ideology and social solidarity, Me and We, is central here and in many other areas. In Chapter Seven I’ll provide a much more extended discussion of the notion of the public commons. Now, however, I want to move on to the final hypothesis about why Me Medicine is on the rise: the elevated status in our culture of choice and autonomy.

4. The sacredness of personal choice and individualism

We’ve already seen that personalized genetic testing plays heavily on the first person singular: deCODEme, Knome, 23andMe and their like. That’s the personal part: the choice part is equally important. Autonomy and its partner choice are the paramount values in the dominant paradigm of medical ethics (Beauchamp and Childress 2009) and, arguably, in society as a whole.  

In medical ethics, autonomy originally played an important role in elevating patient-centered care over medical paternalism, the notion that “doctor knows best” in judging the interests of the patient. The ideal of patient-centered medicine insisted instead that the wishes of competent adult patients should be respected, even if it meant refusing potentially life-saving treatment. Autonomy is also central to the Declaration of Helsinki principles for research ethics, to protect those who might be coerced into consenting to take part in trials. Autonomy came to be seen as the most important of the “four principles” (along with beneficence, non-maleficence and justice), in the approach that dominated the teaching of medical ethics for many years in the US and UK (Beauchamp and Childress 2009, Gillon 1986). Outside observers, however, have contended that overemphasis on autonomy has impoverished medical ethics as a whole (Hedgecoe 2004, Fox and Swazey 2008). 

However, the supremacy of autonomy and individual choice in medical ethics hasn’t gone unchallenged (Dickenson, Huxtable and Parker 2010: 191). “The choice model falsely reduces all ethics to whether something is genuinely chosen, which results in minimising all other injustices (Widdows 2011: 13). Feminist bioethicists have asked whether autonomy is too individualistic, needing to be balanced with a focus on relationships and power (Sherwin 1992, Tong et al. 2004). Some medical ethicists have examined the comparative claims of autonomy and trust (O’Neill 2002) or advocated a more communitarian approach (Callhan 1984, 2003; Parker 1999, 2012; Etzioni 2011). Others have followed such thinkers as Hans Jonas in arguing that in an age of unpredictble technological change, we need to think more about our communal responsbilities than our individual rights (Jonas 1984).

More sophisticated concepts of autonomy (e.g. Frankfurt 1971, Dworkin 1984) do distinguish between acting on your immediate inclination and acting in according with your stable value system, arguing that only the second kind of choice is genuinely autonomous. But that seems a long way from the manner in which personal choice is used as a mantra in personalized medicine, as later chapters will show.

The exalted place of personal choice is not a cultural universal. In France, for example, the  values of solidarity and protecting the vulnerable regularly trump free markets, choice and individualism in framing bioethics laws (Dickenson 2011). Likewise, the Nordic countries are concerned that their more communal values may be threatened by over-emphasis on choice in consumer medicine (Tupasela 2010). But in the United States, it’s been said, liberals are almost as prone as conservatives to elevate individual freedom over the welfare of society (Darnovsky 2010). By selecting  the “right to choose” as likely to be the most psychologically and politically effective counterweight to the “right to life” in the abortion debates, progressives unwittingly hitched their wagon to what later turned out to be the ubiquitous neo-liberal ideology of choice. 

It’s much the same with commercial “surrogacy” (more accurately termed pregnancy outsourcing, since the “surrogate” mother is the real mother in our common law system). There, paternalism—denying someone freedom of choice—is used as a knock-down argument against which there’s meant to be no recourse: “That doctors would be so paternalistic as to deny women the option of using a surrogate if the surrogate were willing to do so is simply outrageous” (Johnson 2010). The same tactic is used with organ sale: “To ban a market in organs is, paradoxically to constrain what people can do with their own lives” (Savulescu 2003: 138-139).  But some see this maneuver as a form of censorship—and censorship is not known, of course, for enhancing individual choice.

[This] argument shows why focusing only on autonomy silences other ethical concerns, as to deny the validity of choice or the permissibility of a chosen act is to be ‘paternalistic’, ‘disempowering’, ‘moralistic’, ‘patronising’ – and lots of other not so nice things: …paternalism is a particularly dirty word in ethics. As a result it becomes impossible to critique any practice if someone – anyone – has chosen it – as to do this is apparently to deny and undermine someone’s autonomy. …In this way then the consent model reduces all ethics to choice and silences and trumps other ethical concerns. This does not protect the individual, but leaves him or her vulnerable and open to exploitation (Widdows 2011, pp. 15-16 ).

In a less blatant manner—but probably only because the debate hasn’t really got going yet-- discussion about direct-to-consumer genetic testing has centered on whether it enhances personal responsibility for detecting and directing your own future health, or whether the information available to consumers is too misleading to allow a genuinely informed choice. Those questions matter, but they aren’t the end of the affair. In particular, they have nothing whatsoever to say about the harmful effects of Me Medicine on We Medicine, particularly when denial of free choice is used to summarily dismiss vital public health measures such as vaccination programs or travel restrictions during epidemics (Battin et al. 2008). 

Choice isn’t a knock-down argument in personalized medicine. As with prostitution or pregnancy outsourcing, even if individuals make choices, those choices influence and are influenced by the social context in which the practice is embedded. It is a blatantly false assumption that whatever you do, you’ve chosen to do, and that you’ve made your individual choice independently of any social, political or economic factors. That’s actually a very simple point, but it has to be made and repeated constantly in our culture. In the unfamiliar context of a new biotechnology, such as retail genetics, there’s a particular temptation not to think through the wider social consequences, but simply to fall back on the old familiar argument: “what’s the problem, if that’s what people choose to do?” 

Philosopher Zahra Meghani (2010) argues that we always have to understand individual medical choices, such as whether to go abroad to buy eggs or to hire a “surrogate” mother, in the context of global neo-liberalism and its core policies: privatization, deregulation and commodification. Rather than an apolitical, one-size-fits-all argument like choice, we also have to understand local realities. Of course, it’s not just the Third World that possesses its own local realities: very particular factors characterize American culture as well. In this chapter I’ve made a start on examining some of those factors that might be particularly relevant to the push for consumer medicine—including a sense of threat, consumerist narcissism and corporate interests. Taking personal choice at face value closes down that analysis before it’s even properly begun: it’s a lazy argument that does none of the necessary work.

The effect of failure by those on the political  left to challenge the mantra of personal choice is that progressives have too readily retreated from challenging neo-liberal deregulation of biotechnology and corporate interests, when representatives of those interests accuse them of wanting to limit consumers’ freedom of choice (Darnovsky 2010). They haven’t done all they could to identify the phenomenon of Me Medicine and to challenge its reliance on personal choice as a knock-down argument. Simultaneously, progressives have found it difficult to challenge the reaction against communitarian forms of medicine as wrong because they limit individual choice—the argument used to lambast President Obama’s healthcare plans, vaccination programs or swine flu epidemic restrictions. 

The situation is worsened in the United States by the “stem cell wars”, in which it was assumed that progressives would automatically be on the side of science, standing against the evangelical right’s campaign to outlaw embryonic stem cell research. Liberals and progressives, Darnovsky claims, are also too prone to ignore moral issues in the new biotechnologies because they fear being lumped in together with the religious right. In the case of new biotechnologies such as direct-to-consumer genetic testing and enhancement, the corollary is that they may be unwittingly prone to support Me Medicine against We Medicine, where their sympathies would more naturally lie. These issues are complicated: I’ll examine a particularly tough one for political progressives in Chapter Three, the development of supposedly “race-specific” drugs such as BiDil.

While the notion of the social contract may still be more or less intact in Scandinavia,  it was never particularly strong in the United States, and even among academics and activists it’s been weakened—inadvertently—by well-grounded liberal critiques of the way in which it favors one sex or race over another. The social contract as an instrument of civic subordination was brilliantly analyzed by Carole Pateman in her 1988 book The Sexual Contract and by Charles Mills in his 1997 work The Racial Contract. Pateman’s crucial insight was that liberal contractarian theory is blind to the way in which the “original position” (Rawls 1971), from which the state is constructed by voluntary contract, is not really “original” at all. It must be preceded by another sort of compact, in which male domination over women has been established through the mechanism of the patriarchal family, since those establishing the contract in the “state of nature” are generally assumed to be men. Mills builds on this insight to demonstrate how even after the abolition of slavery, people of color likewise continue to be subordinated and oppressed through the mechanism of a supposedly consensual contract in liberal democracy: the consent of the governed. 

In their collaboration Contract and Domination, Pateman and Mills differ crucially on how refractory the concept of contract really is. While Mills thinks that contract theory can be “modified and used for emancipatory purposes” (Pateman and Mills 2007: 2) Pateman continues to maintain that contract is inherently an instrument of domination—although other feminists have argued that what’s wrong with the sexual contract is not that it is a contract, but that it is sexual (Dickenson 1997). Because  the so-called “marriage contract”—actually not a legal contract at all-- was blatantly oppressive, feminists had good reason to distrust the social contract more generally. But along with the other factors sketched out in this chapter, that skepticism may have inadvertently encouraged distrust of “We”-ness when it represents false inclusivity. 

Unconstrained commodification of the body seems to Pateman to make the concept of the social contract even more suspect. “Commodification is proceeding at such an extraordinarily rapid rate; there is virtually nothing left now that is outside the reach of private property, contract and alienation,’ she remarks to Mills in a dialogue at the outset of their joint book. “That is one reason why I’m much less happy than you with trying to salvage contract theory” (Pateman and Mills 2007: 14). But without some notion of common interests in healthcare, embodied in something like contractual form, what protects us against the unstoppable rise of Me Medicine? That may sound like pastry in the stratosphere, but international agreements and treaties such as the European Patent Convention have been used to good effect in protecting the human genome, as the joint property of humanity, against “the great genome grab” of commercial patents. Likewise, Article 14 of the 2005 UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights introduces a principle of social responsibility for health, going beyond shopworn individualistic bioethics.

I’ll return to these considerations in the final chapter, when I try to establish how we can reverse the trend to “Me” above “We” in how we use modern biotechnology—how we can reclaim it for the common good. Now it’s now time to analyze that technology in greater detail. In suggesting four possible reasons why “Me” is privileged over “We”—threat, narcissism, corporate interests and the sacredness of choice—I’ve begun by situating the technology in its wider cultural and political context. The next step is to apply those four hypotheses to four areas of Me Medicine: retail genetics, pharmacogenomics, private umbilical cord blood banking and enhancement technologies. 
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